Abstract Sponge functions were introduced by Bertoni et al. as an alternative to the classical Merkle-Damgård design. Many hash function submissions to the SHA-3 competition launched by NIST in 2007, such as CubeHash, Fugue, Hamsi, JH, Keccak and Luffa, derive from the original sponge design, and security guarantees from some of these constructions are typically based on indifferentiability results. Although indifferentiability proofs for these designs often bear significant similarities, these have so far been obtained independently for each construction. In this work, we introduce the parazoa family of hash functions as a generalization of "sponge-like" functions. Similarly to the sponge design, the parazoa family consists of compression and extraction phases. The parazoa hash functions, however, extend the sponge construction by enabling the use of a wider class of compression and extraction functions that need to satisfy certain properties. More importantly, we prove that the parazoa functions satisfy the indifferentiability notion of Maurer et al. under the assumption that the underlying permutation is ideal. Not surprisingly, our indifferentiability result confirms the bound on the original sponge function, but it also carries over to a wider spectrum of hash functions and eliminates the need for a separate indifferentiability analysis.
Introduction
Traditionally, hash functions are designed following the Merkle-Damgård iterative design [1, 2] : to construct a cryptographic hash function H : Z * 2 → Z n 2 that maps bit strings of arbitrary length to outputs of fixed length, one first builds a fixed input length compression function f : Z n 2 × Z m 2 → Z n 2 and then applies it in an iterative manner. Here, the input message M ∈ Z * 2 is first padded injectively into a bit string of a length multiple of m. The main design objective behind the Merkle-Damgård iteration is collision security preservation: showing that the Merkle-Damgård hash function is collision secure (Col) when the underlying compression function f is assumed to be also Col secure. The preservation is achieved by applying the Merkle-Damgård-strengthening [3] : a suffix-free message padding function used in conjunction with a fixed initialization value IV. A broad range of hash function applications requires further security requirements, such as preimage resistance, second preimage resistance, and resistance to the length extension attack. Together with Col security, these are outlined as the main security requirements by NIST [4] in their call for the design of a future SHA-3 hash algorithm. Unfortunately, the strengthened Merkle-Damgård design does not preserve the properties of second preimage and preimage security [5] , and moreover, it does not preclude length extension attacks [6] . As a result, several MerkleDamgård design alternatives have appeared in the literature. These achieve some of the former security properties and among others include the chop-Merkle-Damgård [7] , prefix-free Merkle-Damgård [6] , HAIFA [8] , NMAC [9] , and Enveloped Merkle-Damgård [10] hash functions. Provided that the padding rule is suffix-free, all of the outlined hash functions preserve Col [11] .
To exhibit a preservation result for a security property X , one assumes that the underlying compression function f also satisfies the property X . Although this idea is widely employed, one may wonder if it is strictly needed. Instead, one may consider a different approach and iterate a weak compression functions sufficiently many times to obtain a strong hash function.
In 2007, Bertoni et al. introduced the sponge hash functions [12] as an alternative of the Merkle-Damgård design. The sponge hash function design begins with an absorbing phase, in which the message is compressed iteratively, and ends with an extraction phase, in which the hash digest is extracted in a possibly iterative manner. The sponge design idea is to obtain a secure hash function by iterating a compression function that does not necessarily satisfy the main hash function security properties. Sponge functions iteratively "absorb" message blocks of r -bits per compression function f call, where the iterated state is of size r + c bits with c being the so-called capacity. Finally, the hash digest is extracted r bits at a time by applying the extraction function g. The sponge function employs a single Following the indifferentiability framework of Maurer et al. [13] , it has been proven in [14] that sponge functions are indifferentiable from a random oracle under the assumption that π behaves like a random permutation. In particular, a sponge function behaves like a random oracle for up to O(2 c/2 ) queries.
Since the introduction of sponge functions, it has been a standard practice in the cryptographic community to call hash functions "sponge-like" if they bear resemblances with the original sponge design in terms of iterating a wide state and employing underlying permutations in an extraction and absorbing phases. Despite the similarities, the indifferentiability results of the sponge hash function do not carry over in a straightforward manner to the "sponge-like" constructions, and hence, an independent security analysis is required. At times even a small adjustment to the sponge design may render it insecure (cf. Sect. 3). It is thus an interesting research problem to come up with a secure class of hash functions generalizing the original sponge construction and the results of which could simply be carried over to its members.
Our contributions
In this work, we introduce the parazoa family of hash functions, 1 as a generalization of the sponge hash function. Our generalization is crafted toward obtaining secure "spongelike" hash functions in the indifferentiability theoretic framework by Maurer et al. [13] . The parazoa hash function family allows for a wider class of compression and extraction functions that satisfy a set of simple conditions. These conditions facilitate the indifferentiability proof, but we note that these are easily satisfied and realistic for practical purposes. Similar to the original sponge design, parazoa functions allow for variable length outputs. In [16, Sect. 4 .2], Stam analyzes permutation-based compression functions satisfying certain criteria, "overloaded single call Type-I compression functions", that are similar to the compression functions employed in the parazoa design (albeit the requirements posited in [16, Def. 17] are stronger). The major difference is that in the parazoa design, the compression function is not required to be preimage/collision resistant. In particular, Stam leaves it as an open problem to analyze security of overloaded single call compression functions in the iteration.
We prove that the maximum advantage of any distinguisher in differentiating a parazoa hash function, based on ideal primitive π , from a random oracle is upper bounded by
, where the distinguisher makes at mostueries of length at most K blocks. Here, s denotes the iterated state size, p denotes the number of bits extracted in one execution of the extraction function, and d is called the capacity loss, a quantity inherent to the specific parazoa design (cf. Table 1 ). Even though the indifferentiability proof focuses on parazoa designs where both the compression and extraction function are based on one single permutation, the result easily extends to designs where multiple random permutations and/or random functions are employed.
Naturally, the sponge function design [12] falls within the categorization of parazoa functions, and our indifferentiability result confirms the bound of [14] . Additional hash function designs covered by the parazoa specification are Grindahl [17] and second round SHA-3 candidate hash functions CubeHash [18] , Fugue [19] , JH [20] , Keccak [21] , and (a restricted variant of) Luffa [22] (the hash functions JH and Keccak advanced to the final round of NIST's hash function competition). The implications of our indifferentiability results on these functions are summarized in Table 1 , and we elaborate on it in Sect. 7. We note that not all obtained bounds are as expected. In particular, our indifferentiability bound on JH is worse than the indifferentiability bound proven by Bhattacharyya et al. [23] . The difference may be a price to pay in return for generality. For the generic parazoa design, we note that our indifferentiability bound is optimal: for the original sponge design, the best generic attack meets the derived security bound [12] . Still, for concrete instantiations of the parazoa hash function, a design-specific proof may result in a better bound.
Outline
In Sect. 2, we introduce some mathematical background. In Sect. 3, we derive from the original sponge hash function 
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Here, s is the internal state size, m the number of message bits compressed in one round, p the number of bits extracted in one extraction round, n the number of output bits, and the capacity loss d is further explained in Sect. 5. Parameter q denotes the total number of queries made by the distinguisher, and K is the maximal length of these queries in blocks. For the second round SHA-3 candidates, n ∈ {224, 256, 384, 512}. The hash functions JH and Keccak advanced to the final round of NIST's SHA-3 competition. The results hold under the assumption that the underlying permutations are ideal. For concrete instantiations of these permutations, we refer to Sect. 7. For Fugue, an indifferentiability result has been derived by Halevi et al. [24] , but we do not include the bound as their work considers a different model design a sponge-like function that is insecure in the indifferentiability model. Parazoa functions are introduced and formalized in Sect. 4. An indifferentiability result for parazoa functions is given in Sect. 5, and the formal security proof is given in Sect. 6. We finish the paper with concluding remarks in Sect. 7.
Preliminaries
By Z * 2 , we denote the set of bit strings of arbitrary length. For a positive integer n ∈ N, we denote by Z n 2 the set of bit strings of length n and by Z n 2 * the set of bit strings of length a multiple of n. For two bit strings x, y, we denote by x y their concatenation. The function chop n (x) chops off the n rightmost bits of a bit string x. If X is a set, by x $ ← X , we denote the uniformly random sampling of an element from X . By y ← A(x) and y $ ← A(x), we denote the assignment to y of the output of a deterministic and randomized algorithm A, respectively, when run on input x. For a function f , by dom( f ) and rng( f ), we denote its domain and range, respectively. A random oracle [25] is a function that provides a random output for each new query. A random l-bit permutation is a function that is taken uniformly at random from the set of all l-bit permutations. A random primitive will also be called "ideal". A function f : Z m 2 → Z n 2 for m ≥ n is called balanced if any y ∈ Z n 2 has exactly 2 m−n preimages under f . We define its inverse function by f −1 :
Indifferentiability
The indifferentiability framework, introduced by Maurer et al. [13] , is a powerful notion to guarantee security of cryptographic primitives. Informally, it gives a sufficient condition under which an ideal primitive R can be replaced by some construction C G based on an ideal subcomponent G.
The indifferentiability bound provides security guarantees from the hash function against any security attack [11] . 
The simulator has oracle access to R and runs in time at most t S . The distinguisher runs in time at most t D and makes at mostueries.
Distinguisher D can query both its "left oracle" L (either C or R) and its "right oracle" R (either G or S). We refer to C G , G as the "real world", and to R, S R as the "simulated world"; the distinguisher D converses with either of these worlds and its goal is to tell both worlds apart. In the remainder, R will be a random oracle RO, and G will be a random permutation π . The right oracle R has two interfaces, as the distinguisher can make forward as well as inverse queries to the permutation π .
Differentiability of a "sponge-like" function
In this section, we show that a simple modification of the original sponge design can render it insecure with respect to indifferentiability. To this end, we construct the following sponge-like design. Consider the following hash function H : Z * 2 → Z n 2 that has a state size 2n and processes message blocks of n bits (see also Fig. 1 ). It is based on a 2n-bit permutation π , and uses a simple injective padding function pad to process messages of arbitrary length: pad(M) = M 1 0 −|M|−1 mod n , parsed into message blocks of n bits. For an initial value IV 1 IV 2 , the hash function H processes a message M as follows: H(M) outputs the n rightmost bits of h k , where
Notice that this design follows the original sponge design, with a small modification that the message digest is defined by the other half of the state (but we stress that this observation does not invalidate the security of the sponge function design). We construct a distinguisher D that can distinguish (H π , π) from (RO, S RO ), for any simulator S.
-First, D decides on an arbitrary message M of length 0 < |M| < n. In the real world, where the distinguisher queries H and π , the answers of the oracles satisfy h 1 = y 3 and h 2 = y 2 by construction. In the simulated world, however, h 2 equals RO(M 1 x 3 ). As the simulator generated y 2 without any knowledge of M 1 , equality h 2 = y 2 holds with negligible probability only.
Parazoa functions
Informally, parazoa functions process a message M as follows. Firstly, the message is padded into several integral message blocks of m bits, using a padding function pad : Z * 2 → Z m 2 * . Throughout, by k, we denote the number of message blocks of a padded message. Then, these message blocks are absorbed by the s-bit state (compression phase), by applying sequentially a compression function f :
on the state and the message. Next, the state is squeezed to obtain l ≥ 1 output data blocks of p bits sequentially (extraction phase). The corresponding extraction function is denoted by g :
It operates on the state and returns an updated state and the extract. A finalization function fin : Z pl 2 → Z n 2 combines these l data blocks of p bits into the n-bit message digest. We require that m, p ≤ s, and that pl ≥ n. Both the compression function and the extraction function are based on an s-bit permutation π . Throughout, we assume this permutation to be ideal.
These functions are further explained in Sects. 4.1-4.4 (for ease of presentation, the function pad is introduced at last), together with the requirements of these functions for the security proof in Sect. 5. Now, for a fixed initialization vector IV of size s, the parazoa function H processes a message M as follows:
This function is depicted in Fig. 2 .
Compression function f
On input of a state value v i−1 and a message input M i , the compression function first uses an injection function
to inject the message into the state and then permutes the state with π . This state is then transformed and combined with a feed-forward using a function
The compression function f is depicted in Fig. 3 . For any x ∈ Z s 2 , we define its capacity set Requirement from L in . We require L in to satisfy the following properties: (a) for any x ∈ Z s 2 and v ∈ C(x),
Intuitively, the first requirement guarantees that for a state value
The second requirement intuitively guarantees that two elements x, x ∈ Z s 2 have either the same or disjoint capacity sets. As becomes clear in the proof, this requirement can be relaxed at a security loss of factor 2 m . We notice that these requirements are easily satisfied, and standard injection functions L in satisfy both. In particular, commonly used injection functions, for example, functions that consist of XORing the message with and/or inserting it in a part of the state, clearly satisfy both properties. Note that the second requirement is satisfied for any linear transformation.
Requirement from L out . We require that for any
Extraction function g
On input of a state value v k+i−1 , the extraction function g employs an extracting transformation L ex : Z s 2 → Z p 2 that outputs a data block and then permutes the state with π . Formally, the extraction function g is defined as Fig. 4 . Similar to f , one can consider an additional transformation after the call to the permutation, which may have v k+i−1 as extra input. This generalization would, however, make the proof considerably more complex (see Sect. 7).
Requirement from L ex . We require L ex to be balanced. Intuitively, this requirement means that each extract P ∈ Z p 2 is equally likely to occur. Accordingly, the function
2).
Finalization function fin
The function fin combines the l bit strings, obtained from squeezing the state, into the message digest. In most of the existing sponge-based designs, the finalization function simply consists of concatenating a required number of blocks, l = n/ p , and chopping it to the required length of n bits. Parazoa functions allow for a generalized finalization function.
Requirement from fin. We require fin to be balanced. Intuitively, this requirements means that each digest h is equally likely to occur. Accordingly, the function fin −1 is defined as fin
Padding function pad
The padding function pad is an injective mapping that transforms messages of arbitrary length into messages of length an integral multiple of the block size m. Associated to pad is the function depad that processes a message M as follows: if M = pad(M) for some message M, it outputs this M, otherwise it outputs ⊥. Note that the output is unique as the padding function is injective.
Requirement from pad. We require pad to satisfy the following property: we either have l = 1, or the last block of a padded message, M k , satisfies for any x ∈ Z s 2 and
As explained in Sect. 5.3 in more detail, this requirement comes from the fact that permutation queries to the simulator corresponding to the extraction phase (1c) may correspond to compression function executions f as well. We notice that for the original sponge design, condition (2) translates to requiring that the last block of a padded message is not a zero-block (which is exactly the requirement as posited by the authors of the sponge design in [14] ). Because parazoa functions generalize these functions significantly, this requirement has become more complex accordingly.
Indifferentiability analysis of parazoa functions
In this section, we prove the parazoa function of Sect. 4 indifferentiable from a random oracle, under the assumption that the underlying permutation π behaves like an ideal primitive. Intuitively, the proof consists of demonstrating that there exists a simulator such that no distinguisher can differentiate the real world H π , π from the simulated world RO, S RO , except with negligible probability. For the purpose of the proof, we introduce a technical variable d which we refer to as the capacity loss. Consider the set of all couples (v, x) such that L in (v, M) = x for some M (M is uniquely determinable from v, x). We define d ≥ 0 to be the minimal value such that Criterion 1. For fixed x and fixed P ∈ Z p 2 , there are at
Notice that, as a consequence of the first criterion, we obtain |C(x)| ≤ 2 p+d for any x, as any v ∈ Z s 2 satisfies L ex (v) = P for exactly one P ∈ Z p 2 . We note that the second criterion is not needed in case l = 1 (see Sect. 5.3). The reason why we opt for the name "capacity loss", as well as an intuition behind this parameter, is given in Sect. 5.1. 
Theorem 1 Let π be a random s-bit permutation, and let
where S makes at most q s ≤ q 2 queries to RO and runs in time O(q 2 2 ).
We note that the bound is optimal for the generic parazoa design: for the original sponge design, as a particular instantiation of the parazoa functions, the best generic attack requires about 2 (s− p−d)/2 queries [12] and meets the derived indifferentiability bound. In what remains of this section, an intuition behind the capacity loss d is given in Sect. 5.1, basic preliminary definitions for the description of our simulator are given in Sect. 5.2, and the simulator used in the proof is introduced and explained in more detail in Sect. 5.3 and Fig. 7 . Then, Theorem 1 is formally proven in Sect. 6.
On the capacity loss d
We will provide an intuition for the technical parameter d. It is used in the computation of the indifferentiability security bound: in some cases, the simulator has to generate a value v such that it is not a member of C(x), for one or more values of x, and moreover such that L ex (v) = P for some fixed P. 
Again, criterion 2 is equivalent; we thus obtain d = r = s − p. In this example, the distinguisher has "full control over the state": the first r bits can be freely adjusted by message injection, and the last c bits can be obtained (in most cases) by message extraction.
We note that the sponge-like hash function of Sect. 3 (example 2) still fits in the parazoa framework, and the indifferentiability result of Theorem 1 applies. Yet, as d = s − p, we obtain a trivial bound. The same occurs if we consider an example parazoa function where the message input size m equals the state size s: it turns out that d = s − p, and the indifferentiability result of Theorem 1 results in a trivial bound.
The value d varies between 0 and s − p by construction and ideally attains its minimum. In this case, the number of bits of information that cannot be controlled by the adversary is s − p. This value is exactly the capacity of the sponge hash function. For increasing d, the value s − p − d decreases, and therefore, we call d the "capacity loss".
Defining the simulator
The simulator maintains an initially empty database Sim-π that represents the simulated permutation. It consists of tuples (x, y) ∈ Z s 2 × Z s 2 , where y denotes the sampled image of x under π . The simulator maintains a graph (V, E), which initially consists of the node IV and includes no edges. The edges in E are labeled by messages M ∈ Z m 2 and define input-output pairs of the compression function f : an edge
Abusing notation, we denote by vM −→ w forM ∈ Z m 2 * that there is a path from v to w with the edges labeled byM. By definition of L in , one query pair (x, y) adds at most 2 p+d edges to the graph, namely the edges leaving from the vertices in C(x). By V out , we denote the set of nodes in V with an outgoing edge in By τ (V ) , we denote the tree in (V, E) rooted in IV. Additionally, bȳ τ (V ), we denote the subset of nodes of τ (V ) that are labeled by a correctly padded message.
In addition, the simulator maintains a database . This database will consist of future query inputs x ∈ Z s 2 of which the simulator knows that they correspond to the extraction phase of the parazoa execution (1c). Associated to each x ∈ is a tuple (i, P i+1 · · · P l ) with i ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1}. Essentially, i denotes the number of executions of g that are already simulated for this specific path, and P i+1 , . . . , P l denote the output values of the subsequent executions of g, determined by the simulator before. The idea behind is further explained in Sect. 5.3.
Intuition
As is common in indifferentiability proofs, the simulator needs to be constructed in such a way that the answers from the oracles (H π , π) and (RO, S RO ) are close to identically distributed. In other words, the oracle answers made by the simulator need to be in consistency with the random oracle, in such a sense that any relation among the query answers in real world holds in the simulated world as well. In particular, the simulator needs to pay attention to the following scenario: suppose a path IVM −→ v k is in the graph, forM ∈ rng(pad) (i.e., v k ∈τ (V )). . . . , l) . Then, the values (P 1 , . . . , P l ) should satisfy fin(P 1 , . . . , P l ) = RO(depad(M)) in order for the simulator to maintain consistency. However, in general, the simulator can only guarantee this equation to hold if the P i 's are decided afterM is known, but before v k is known (notice that v k determines P 1 = L ex (v k ) deterministically). The simulator of Fig. 7 handles this problem in a smart way: in the query where the last edge (v k−1 to v k ) is added, the simulator decides on (P 1 , . . . , P l ) on forehand, and based on these, he fixes the next state value v k such that v k ∈ L −1 ex (P 1 ). This value equals the input to the next execution of π in the chaining. It stores (v k ; 1, P 2 , . . . , P l ) in its database . As soon as the simulator is then queried v k , the simulator will apply the same trick: the answer v k+1 ← Sim-π(v k ) will be generated such that v k+1 ∈ L −1 ex (P 2 ). This value v k+1 equals the input to the next execution of π in the chaining. Fig. 7 The simulator S for π used in the proof of Theorem 1. The simulator aborts if a certain GOTO-statement is executed C > 0 times consecutively, for some constant C Subsequently, it replaces the corresponding entry in with (v k+1 ; 2; P 3 , . . . , P l ).
Before describing the simulator in more detail, we note that it includes several GOTO-statements. These statements guarantee the randomly generated values to satisfy certain properties. Associated to the simulator is a constant C > 0: the simulator aborts if a certain GOTO-statement is executed C times consecutively. Due to the inclusion of this parameter C, the simulator operates in polynomial time, rather than in expected polynomial time. In the security proof (Sect. 6), this constant is fixed to a certain value.
The simulator will answer its queries such that the tree τ (V ) grows as little as possible: indeed, any path in the tree may emerge in the need of an extra element in and eventually in an evaluatable query. However, as mentioned before, one query pair (x, y) defines at most 2 p+d edges in the graph, leaving from the nodes in the set C(x). The simulator will answer its queries so as to satisfy the following properties concerning the growth of the graph:
(a) Out of all newly added edges, at most one will be added to the tree. More generally, the simulator assures the following property at any time in the execution:
(b) When a query adds a new edge to the tree, its end node has no outgoing edge. Together with (a), this implies that per query at most one edge is added to the tree; (c) The tree does not contain any colliding paths.
Notice that a query pair (x, y) adds a new edge to the tree if and only if C(x) ∩ τ (V ) = ∅. Indeed, C(x) corresponds to all nodes with an outgoing edge defined by the query pair (x, y). In this case, the simulator needs to assure that properties (a-c) are satisfied. Secondly if x ∈ , the simulator needs to handle as described above. Ideally, the value x satisfies x ∈ and C(x) ∩ τ (V ) = ∅, which explains the algorithm for S −1 . In forward queries to S, however, x is chosen by the distinguisher, and it may be possible that C(x) ∩ τ (V ) = ∅ or x ∈ . We will now explain the algorithm for a forward query x to S, based on the above observations.
In case C(x) ∩ τ (V ) = ∅ (lines 016-017), no edge will be added to the tree, and (a-c) are trivially satisfied. In case C(x) ∩ τ (V ) = ∅, by (4) and the definition of L in , there exists one unique couple v ∈ τ (V ) and M ∈ Z m 2 such that L in (v, M) = x. By construction, the current query adds the edge v M −→ w to the tree, where w = L out (y, v, M). In lines 022 and 033, the simulator assures that this is the only edge added to the tree, that is, that y is chosen such that w ∈ V out (there is no outgoing edge from w) and w ∈ C(x) (no outgoing edge from w will accidentally be added in the current round). Additionally, requirements (a) and (c) are covered by requiring that w does not share a capacity set with a node already in τ (V ): lines 023 and 034.
Hence, a query adds at most one edge to the tree, and in particular, in case of evaluatable queries, the last edge v k−1 M −→ v k is really added at last. We still need to consider this specific case thatτ (V ) is increased. Additionally, we still need to explain the case of x ∈ . τ (V ) gets increased but x ∈ . This case corresponds to the else-clause of line 025: the simulator will proceed as previously described: the next state value v nxt (which equals the first permutation input of the extraction phase) is generated, and the original answer y is generated accordingly in line 031. Notice that we need to assure that no collision in Sim-π occurs (line 032). In line 036, the node v nxt is added to , provided 1 < l. Note that, by (c), the path to v k is unique, and (P 1 , . . . , P l ) is generated in a nonambiguous way; τ (V ) does not get increased and x ∈ . This specific case corresponds to the if-clause of line 002: again, the simulator will generate the next state value v nxt (which equals the next permutation input of the extraction phase) and generate the original answer y accordingly (line 006). It will update in lines 014-015. Note that in this ifclause it may still be possible that C(x)∩τ (V ) = ∅. Then, the simulator assures properties (a-c) as mentioned before (by lines 010 and 011); τ (V ) gets increased and x ∈ . It may be the case that a query x to S is an element of and moreover adds an edge to the tree (this is checked in the if-clause of line 008). However, as we will now explain, the message block that labels this edge can never be the last block of a padded message, and hence,τ (V ) will not be increased. As x ∈ , this specific value is fixed by the simulator on forehand (in the previous query of the extraction phase defined as v nxt ). In particular, it is generated in the query where (x , y ) ∈ Sim-π is generated such that either L out (y , v , M ) = x for some v , M (line 031, or such that y = x (line 006). However, x had been generated such that C(x), all start-nodes of the edges defined by x, had an empty intersection with τ (V ) (lines 004 and 029). 2 Also, in all future queries, it is assured that new queries cannot make the link to this specific x (due to " x∈ C(x)" in lines 010, 022 and 033). As a consequence, if the query (x, y) adds an edge to the tree, this only happens for an edge leaving from the end node of an edge defined by (x , y ) (as this is the only query round in which C(x) is not avoided as end node of a newly added edge to the tree). In other words, after the forward query x to S, we have the path 
Given the specific property of x (in the beginning of this paragraph), it either satisfies
By the requirement in Sect. 4.4, we have either l = 1 (which means that = ∅ at all time) or that M 2 can never be the last block of a padded message. Summarizing, a query x ∈ never increases τ (V ).
The full proof of Theorem 1 is given in Sect. 6.
Proof of Theorem 1
Let S be the simulator of Fig. 7 , and let D be any distinguisher that makes at most q 1 left queries of maximal length (K − 1)m bits, where K ≥ 1, and q 2 right queries. Recall from Def. 1 that the goal is to bound:
Theorem 1 will be proven via a game-playing argument. In this aspect, our result is fundamentally different from the result obtained by Bertoni et al. for the original sponge design [14] . Each game consists of a left and a right oracle. In the proof, G 1 will equal the simulated world and G 9 the real world. We will go from game 1 to game 9 stepwise and obtain a bound on (5) using a hybrid argument. We define C = 1, hence the simulator of Fig. 7 aborts if a certain GOTO-statement is executed. (Fig. 8) . The left oracle L 1 of game 1 is defined to be a lazily sampled random oracle, and the right oracle R 1 consists of the two interfaces defined by the simulator of Fig. 7 , with an additional difference that a failure condition bad is added to the GOTOstatements in lines 005, 007, 012, 024, 030, 032, 035 and 104. The distinguisher does not see the difference until the adversary in game 1 sets bad (recall that we put C = 1). We obtain Pr D RO,S RO (Fig. 8) . The left oracle of game 1 is replaced by a so-called relay oracle L 2 that passes (Fig. 8) . The left oracle of game 2 is now replaced by an implementation of the parazoa function, which moreover uses the right oracle as a subroutine, rather than L 1 directly. The right oracle itself remains unchanged. In Prop. 1, it is proven that, as long as the bad flag is not set in any of the two games, both are identical. Formally, we obtain that Pr
Note that in game 3, as well as in all subsequent games, the right oracle will be queried at most r := (K + l)q 1 + q 2 times. Indeed, in all of the following games, the left oracle queries the right oracle at most K times in the compressing phase and l times in the extraction phase. All subsequent right oracles are constructed in such a way that each query to this oracle adds at most 1 element to Sim-π .
The right oracle R 2 of game 4 differs from oracle R 1 of game 3 in the sense that h
and 027) is replaced by (P 1 , . . . , P l )
Observe that the games are perfectly indistinguishable: in game 3, R 1 is the only algorithm querying L 1 , and as the padding is injective, he never queries L 1 twice on the same value. Therefore, he can just as well generate the random values h himself. Then, as the function fin is balanced, we have, for any α ∈ Z pl 2 :
In other words, the values (P 1 , . . . , P l ) follow the uniform random distribution on pl bits, and therefore, the right oracle can just generate them directly. Formally, we have (Fig. 9) . In game 4, all values (P 1 , . . . , P l ) are randomly generated as soon as the first one is needed. The remaining l − 1 values are then associated to a node x ∈ (line 036), and as soon as x is queried, the next value, P i+1 , is taken off of the list and processed. In game 5, these values P i are not anymore generated in advance, but generated when needed. As a consequence, we implicitly adjust the definition of , in the sense that each element is labeled by an index i ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1} only. As in both cases the values (P 1 , . . . , P l ) are generated uniformly at random, a distinguisher cannot see the difference. Consequently, we obtain Pr (Fig. 9) . In game 5, the values P i (i = 1, . . . , l) are taken uniformly at random, and the state values v nxt are taken according to the property that P i = L ex (v nxt ) for all i = 1, . . . , l (lines 004 and 028 in Fig. 9 ). In game 6, this is the other way around: v nxt (recall that this value equals the input to the next permutation execution in the extraction phase) is taken randomly (permutationwise), and the value P i is taken such that P i = L ex (v nxt ) still holds. Hence, the only changes are in lines 003-004 and 027-028. In Prop. 2, it is proven that Pr (Fig. 10) . In game 6, concretely in the blocks 003-008, where the oracle is queried on an x belonging to the extraction phase, and 027-032, where the query answer to x will initiate the extraction phase, the oracle decides on its answer y based on the next state value v nxt . In game 7, the answer y is taken uniformly at random, and the next state v nxt is generated accordingly. The values P i = L ex (x i ) are not used in R 5 , and their generation is omitted. In Prop. 3, it is proven that Pr (Fig. 10) . The right oracle R 6 in game 8 differs from R 5 in game 7 in the sense that the GOTO-statements that are accompanied with a bad-statement are removed. As a consequence, game 7 and 8 proceed identically as long as the bad flag is not set in game 7. Formally, we obtain that Pr
3 , R 7 ). The right oracle R 7 mimics a lazily sampled random permutation π , and the left oracle is the parazoa specification querying this right oracle. Hence, G 9 = (H π , π), and thus Pr D G 9 = 1 = Pr D H π ,π = 1 . It turns out that R 6 of game 8 also mimics a lazily sampled permutation, due to the removal of the GOTO-statements. In particular, any forward query to R 6 is answered with a y ∈ Z s 2 \rng(Sim-π). As a consequence, we obtain
We conclude that (5) reduces to: 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 Pr
In the remainder of the proof, we will evaluate the probability that the distinguisher sets bad in game 3. Thereafter, we will elaborate on the other probabilities. Consider the jth query ( j = 1, . . . , r ) to R 1 . Notice that, by Lem. 1, we have | | ≤ j − 1 and |τ (V )| ≤ j. By the union bound, the probability that bad is set in this round, Pr j , equals the probability that bad is set in either of the Summarizing, we obtain Pr
. Now for Pr 104 j : notice that bad is set in line 104 if x, taken uniformly at random from a set of size at least 2 s − r , hits a set of size at most j2 p+d + j − 1 (by the definition of d, each v is a member of at most 2 p+d capacity sets). Concluding, Pr
. By the union bound, and under the assumption that 2r < 2 s− p−1 , we thus obtain
For games G 1 , G 2 , the same analysis holds. For games G 5 , G 6 , G 7 , the same bound can be obtained similarly, and we only highlight the major differences: (i) v nxt is now generated randomly from a set of size at least 2 s − 2r , and (ii) we cannot use the fact that L ex (v nxt ) = P is fixed anymore, but still the same analysis holds with 2 d replaced by 2 p+d .
In general, however, the same bound is obtained for these games. Now, combined with (6), these bounds give the claimed result.
Proposition 1 As long as bad is not set in any of the games 2 and 3, both games are identical. Formally, we have
Proof We need to prove that, until bad is set in either one of the two games, the query outcomes in games 2 and 3 are identically distributed. As both games employ the same right oracle, a distinguisher can differentiate game 2 and 3 only based on its answers obtained from the left oracle.
Consider an execution of game 2 or game 3. Recall that Sim-π consists of a list of query pairs to the right oracle and that (V, E) is the graph defined by these. Denote by V = (V L , V R ) any view of a distinguisher on an execution of the oracle (G 2 or G 3 ). Here, V L is a list of different query pairs (M i , h i ), and V R a list of query pairs for the right world. In game 2, we have V R = Sim-π , and in game 3, we have V R ⊆ Sim-π (by construction). Denote by (V , E) the subgraph of (V, E) generated by the query pairs in V R . We need to prove that, given any view V, outcomes of new queries to the left oracle are identically distributed in both games. Formally, we need to prove that for any M ∈ Z * 2 and any α ∈ Z n 2 , we have
Define (M 1 , . . . , M k ) = pad(M) to be the padded message of M. We will call the queried message M "determined" by
. We will prove that if M is not determined by V R , both probabilities in (7) equal 1/2 n . On the other hand, if M is determined by V R , both properties are still equal (although they may naturally have a higher value).
M is not determined by V R . As the tree in (V , E) contains no path labeled by M 1 · · · M k , and moreover M ∈ dom(V L ), in both games the oracle L 1 had never been queried on M. Now, in game 2, L 2 passes the query through to L 1 , which will generate its answer uniformly at random from Z n 2 (line 201). In game 3, the for-loop of line 402 will force the right oracle to grow the path IV (P 1 , . . . , P l ) . Consequently, the value h outputted by L 3 in line 409 exactly equals the one randomly sampled; M is determined by V R . By construction, the path
is in the tree, for some v k−1 , v k . But by Lem. 1, the tree is only increased with one edge at a time, and as a consequence, the edge (v k−1 , v k ) labeled by M k must have been added to the tree after M 1 · · · M k−1 are known. Additionally, the tree is never increased in inverse queries (Lem. 1), and a determinatable path is never created in queries for x ∈ (Lem. 2). In other words, this specific edge had been added in a forward query via the else-clause of line 025. In particular, the oracle R 1 already gener-
(by Lem. 1, there are no collisions in the tree, and thus the oracle indeed queried L 1 on M). He additionally defined the node v k as the next state in the extraction phase corresponding to the above-described path. Additionally, he saved (v k ; 1, P 2 , . . . , P l ) in . By construction, this value v k satisfies L ex (v k ) = P 1 . In particular, V R and jointly deterministically define (P 1 , . . . , P l ), and therewith L 1 (M). However, the distinguisher does not know . Let i * ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1} be the maximal index such that v k , . . . , v k+i * −1 ∈ dom(V R ). Recall that we have P i = L ex (v k+i−1 ) and v k+i = Sim-π(v k+i−1 ), for i = 1, . . . , l. Then, using this equation, the distinguisher can deterministically determine P 1 , . . . , P i * from V R . As Sim-π(v k+i * ) is unknown to the distinguisher, and all other values in (V L , V R ) are unrelated, 4 the distinguisher is oblivious to the values P i * +1 , . . . , P l such that fin(P 1 , . . . , P l ) = L 1 (M). This analysis holds for both games: in game 2, the oracle L 2 will output this predetermined h. In game 3, by construction of the if-clause of line 002, the oracle L 3 will output the same predetermined h. (Fig. 9) , both games are statistically indistinguishable. Formally, we have:
Proposition 2 As long as bad is not set in any of the games 5 and 6
Proof For the purpose of the proof, we construct two new games 5a and 6a. Game 5a differs from game 5 in the sense that line 028 is replaced by:
bad ← true; GOTO 028a
and similar for line 004 of game 5. D does not see the difference, and hence Pr D G 5 = 1 = Pr D G 5a = 1 . Game 6a differs from game 6 in the sense that line 027 is replaced by: 
Consider game 5a and assume D G 5a did not set bad. Suppose the right oracle has been queried j − 1 times and consider the jth query x to the right oracle. As the simulator will either execute line 004 or 028 (not both) and will set bad with a higher probability in 028c, it suffices to consider this line only. Notice that we have |dom(Sim-π) ∪ {x} ∪ | ≤ 2 j − 1 (by Lem. 1). The probability that bad is set in 028c equals the probability that a value v nxt , randomly sampled from a set of size 2 s (recall that line 028 is preceded by
and that L ex is balanced), hits a value in a set of size at most 2 j − 1. As a consequence, bad is set in the jth query with probability at most 
Proof The proof is similar to the one of Prop. 2, and we only highlight the details. We adjust game 6 as in the proof of Prop. 2. In game 7, we expand lines 003 and 026 similarly. As long as bad and bad are not set in both games, the values (y, v nxt ) are generated identically, and no distinguisher can see the difference. As a consequence, it remains to bound the probability that bad is set in any of the two games. Straightforward computations now result in the required bound. 
Proof (only for game 7) First of all, (iii) is satisfied as any query to the R 5 adds at most one element to . The proof of the other properties is done by mathematical induction. Before the first query to R 5 is made, we have |τ (V ) 0 | = 1 and |τ (E) 0 | = 0 and the claims are naturally satisfied. Now, assume the claims hold after j − 1 queries and consider the jth query. We distinguish between forward and inverse queries.
Inverse query. On input of y, the simulator outputs some value x. This query adds at most 2 p+d edges to the graph, leaving from the vertices in C(x). As the simulator did not set bad in line 104, we have |C(x) ∩ τ (V ) j−1 | = 0, and as a consequence, the size of the tree is not increased. The claims now follow by the induction hypothesis.
Forward query. On input of x, the simulator outputs some value y, and this is the only query pair added to Sim-π . This query adds at most 2 p+d edges to the graph, leaving from the vertices in C(x). If |C(x) ∩ τ (V ) j−1 | = 0, the same happens as for inverse queries, and all properties are satisfied by induction. Suppose C(x) ∩ τ (V ) j−1 = ∅. By the induction hypothesis for (i), there is exactly one value v in this intersection, which by the properties of L in uniquely defines M such that an edge v M −→ w to w = L out (y, v, M) will be added. Thus, this (x, y)-pair defines exactly one new edge in the tree starting from a node in τ (V ) j−1 . In terms of Fig. 10 , either the if-clause of line 008 or the else-clause of 018 will be executed. In both cases, as bad is not set, y is generated in the same manner, and for simplicity, we will analyze the run of the if-clause of line 008 only. As bad is not set via line 010, the end node w is no element of V out ∪ C(x). In other words, w has no outgoing edge in the updated graph. As a consequence, τ (E) j = τ (E) j−1 ∪ {(v, w)}. Also as bad is not set via line 011, the end node w is not yet in the tree τ (V ) j−1 and will henceforth be newly added. These two observations prove property (ii). Remains to prove that the first property is satisfied. To the contrary, suppose |C ∩ τ (V ) j | = 2 for some capacity set C. This implies that v , w ∈ C for some v ∈ τ (V ) j−1 , which contradicts with the fact that bad is not set via line 011.
Lemma 2 Consider games 2 and 3 (Fig. 8) and assume that bad is not set. A query R 1 (x), with x ∈ , never increases τ (V ).
Proof First of all, if l = 1, lines 015 and 036 never increase , and the claim is naturally satisfied as = ∅ throughout. Otherwise, by virtue of the condition in Sect. 4.4, the last block of a padded message always satisfies (2). We will show that, if a query R 1 (x) for x ∈ adds an edge to the tree, the message block M that labels this path satisfies
Inverse queries never increase the tree (Lem. 1), and we will ignore them for simplicity. For readability, we will add a subscripts to the values x and the tree. Denote by τ (V ) j the tree in (V, E) after the jth query, for j = 1, . . . , r . Suppose x j is the jth query to the right oracle, and suppose x j ∈ (notice that x j occurs exactly once in , due to lines 003 and 028). The node x j had been added to in either line 015 or 036, in one of the previous queries, say the ith query, for i < j. By lines 004 and 029, x j had been generated such that C(x j )∩τ (V ) i−1 = ∅. Due to the statement " x∈ C(x)" in lines 010, 022 and 033, it is assured that any new node added to the tree in the (i +1)th up to the ( j −1)th query is not in C(x j ). Formally, we have C(
As moreover C(x j )∩τ (V ) i−1 = ∅, this means that the query (coming from the ith execution) . By the properties of L in , these values uniquely define the message block M that labels the new edge created by the query x j , namely:
However, by construction (lines 006 or 031), we either have
. Consequently, the message block violates the (2) . Therefore, M cannot be the last block of any padded message, and in particularτ (V ) is not increased.
Concluding remarks
We now present some comments on the parazoa hash function design.
Ambiguity. The design as described in Sect. 4 allows for ambiguous interpretations. In particular, it is straightforward to construct schemes that can be described as a parazoa function in different ways:
-Let P be any s-bit permutation. For any parazoa design with l = 1, the same design is described if L in , L out and
L ex = L ex • P −1 and with the initial chaining value redefined as IV = P(IV). Although this modification does not harm the security of the described parazoa design, the obtained indifferentiability bound may differ. In particular, this modification may affect the value d (cf. Sect. 5); -Consider a parazoa design where L ex (v) = chop s− p (v), and fin(P 1 , . . . , P l ) = P 1 · · · P l . Then, the same design is described if these functions are replaced by L ex (v) = v and fin (P 1 , . . . , P l ) = chop s− p (P 1 ) · · · chop s− p (P l ). However, our proof fails for the second description, whereas this need not be the case for the first description. This paradoxical ambiguity is because the parazoa design allows for any type of finalization function, and therefore, we cannot base security of the parazoa function on specific properties of the finalization. For instance, our scheme does not make any distinction between fin and fin (P 1 , . . . , P l ) = chop sl− pl (P 1 · · · P l ).
In general, different descriptions of a parazoa design may result in different bound, and the best bound naturally applies.
Generalization of g.
It is possible to consider the parazoa hash function design with a more complicated function g, namely to define it as g(v k+i−1 ) = (v k+i , P i ), where (x, P i ) ← M in (v k+i−1 ), y ← π(x) and v k+i ← M out (y, v k+i−1 ) (see Fig. 11 ). It is straightforward to generalize the simulator and the proof to this case. The simulator of Fig. 7 is modified mainly in the lines 003 and 028 (one randomly generates x nxt as input to the next permutation and generates v nxt randomly from M −1
in (x nxt , P i+1 ) rather than L −1 ex (P i+1 )) and in line 006 (one deterministically finds the previous state value v prev and computes y such that v nxt = M out (y, v prev )). The proof results in the same bound. For this proof, we would require both M in and M out to be bijections on the state, and additionally that, restricted to the extract P i , the function M in is balanced.
Generalization to (multiple) different ideal primitives.
The description of the parazoa design is based on one permutation π , which is utilized by both f and g. We notice that in the design and the proof, π can easily be replaced by a random function. Also, it is straightforward to consider two different permutations π 1 , π 2 (e.g., f is build on π 1 and g on π 2 ). We notice that, in some cases, the usage of different permutations may improve the indifferentiability bound. For instance, if l = 1, and the last execution of f is defined to use a different permutation, the variable d (cf. Sect. 5) becomes superfluous.
Remarks on the applications. In Sect. 1.1, we sketched several applications of parazoa functions, and we will briefly elaborate on this. The original Sponge follows the parazoa design with m = p; if we relax this requirement to allow for p = m, the indifferentiability bound results in O((K q) 2 /2 s−max{ p,m} ) (d = max{m − p, 0}), where s is the state size of the sponge. The indifferentiability bounds for the lightweight hash functions Quark, PHOTON and SPONGENT follow directly. The Grindahl hash function (simplified, with zero final blank rounds) satisfies the parazoa function design with d = m, which is caused by the fact that L in inserts the message in the leftmost part, while L ex outputs the rightmost part of the state. With respect to NIST's SHA-3 hash function competition, we can consider the following second round candidates. CubeHash consists of a permutation P executed 16 times iteratively, and the result holds if P 16 is assumed to be a random permutation. In its final transformation, one bit in the chaining is swapped, which results in d = 1. Hamsi [26] employs two different permutations, one of which is exclusively used in the last compression function. We note that, even though the permutation and compression function input sizes of Hamsi differ, the design can be described as a parazoa function: instead of chopping half of the state at the end of a compression function evaluation f and concatenating the remaining state with the expanded message in the subsequent call to f , one can just as well leave the state unchopped and overwrite the redundant part of the state with the expanded message in the next evaluation of f . A simplified version of Hamsi, where each compression function employs one single permutation, would be insecure as the attack of Sect. 3 would apply. However, it is fair to believe that for the original Hamsi, a better bound can be obtained (see previous paragraph). The Fugue design can be considered to have a final compression function execution based on a permutation π differing from the permutation π used in the iteration (for instance, for Fugue-256, we have π = (SMIX • CMIX • ROR3) 2 and π = G [19] ). Still, the parazoa design can handle Fugue, and the results carry over. The Luffa compression function consists of a linear function operating on the state, and multiple smaller permutations executed in parallel. The results hold under the assumption that this parallel execution behaves like one random permutation. 5 For both Fugue and Luffa, our result has been confirmed by Bhattacharyya and Mandal [27] .
